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by
Jagdish Bhagwati
This paper is written for the Symposium on the World Trading System, organised by the WTO
and the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, on Thursday, 30th April 1998.
The 50 years of the multilateral trading system, as spanned by the birth of GATT at the
beginning and the blossoming of the WTO at the end, merit unrestrained applause. Dividing the
normal Centennial celebratory period by half is truly appropriate: while there has much been
accomplished in the past 50 years, much remains to be done in the next 50 as well. There is little
that I can add to the experience and insights that my many friends at this Symposium will say on
this occasion.
But perhaps I can provide a unique perspective since I happen to combine contrasting
personas. I was born in a developing country (India)  but now am a citizen of a developed one
(the United States). I am a scholar of trade theory but I also write on trade policy (unlike many
who are not handicapped by scientific pursuits and knowhow ). I am an academic (and the epithet
“professor” is occasionally thrown at me in debate as if it was an affliction) but have also been “on
the inside” (since Arthur Dunkel made me Economic Policy Adviser to the Director General,
GATT, during 1991-1993).  [I should not overdo this as I have limitations as well, which I was
made aware of during the ill-fated negotiations for fast-track authority for President Clinton
recently. I am informed that, on being faced by the US Ways and Means Committee with my Wall
Street Journal  (September 10, 1997) op.ed. article arguing against linking fast-track to
environmental and labour requirements, Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky is alleged to have
remarked: Bhagwati (garbled: I admit it is a difficult name for lawyers, not for economists who
have been exposed to it excessively) does not understand trade; he has never been in a trade
negotiation. Since a good lawyer friend of mine teaches mock trade negotiations at my university,
I hope to sit in on one of them in the near future and rid myself of this crippling limitation.]
Looking Back
The achievements of GATT in liberalizing trade through reduced border trade barriers are
too well known to need recounting. Successive Rounds of multilateral trade negotiations (MTNs),
culminating in the successful Uruguay Round, have brought down trade tariffs to dramatically low
levels around the world. True, there are still developing countries such as India whose tariffs call
for significant reductions. But it is a mistake to believe, as Mr. Bergsten has argued recently in
Foreign Affairs, that the future task for the WTO will be to exchange
“fair trade”  disciplines offered by the developed countries for lower trade tariffs and restrictions
by the developing countries. In agriculture alone, the tariffication brought about by the Uruguay
Round has now led to sufficiently high tariffs in the developed countries that cry out to be
reduced in future MTN Rounds.
In the same vein, a steadily wider range of sectors with trade barriers has been brought
under the GATT’s axe. Take just two major examples. Agriculture,  having escaped GATT owing
to the 1955 waver, is now back in the picture, with definite steps taken towards freeing of trade
therein with the Uruguay Round. And we now also have progress made on financial and other
services in the GATT under the GATS umbrella.
Equally, the list of GATT’s achievements must include the establishment of  some, though
woefully inadequate, discipline on “fair trade” rules. Economists understand only too well the
misuse that has occurred of rules such as on anti-dumping (AD) measures, with continued capture
of these ironically for  “unfair” trade protectionism.  It is an open secret that AD actions have in
reality nothing to do with  predation,  and that the GATT has been unable to impose the necessary
discipline in this area. On the other hand, it is not hard to imagine what chaos could have reigned
in the absence of the GATT.
The Uruguay Round also must be credited with having brought about a Single
Undertaking, with common rules and obligations for all members, with exceptions largely reduced
to transitional periods for developing countries. We thus finally have a WTO which aims to have a
single set of rules to govern world trade. This is a considerable achievement as few of us believe
now, as many of us did in the 1950sthrough 1970s, that there should be Special & Differential
(S&D) treatment for the developing countries. The earlier view was based on the belief that  there
was a different economics governing developing countries, requiring a different policy framework
and  special exemptions permitting readier resort to trade barriers for balance of payments reasons
and on infant industry protection grounds, thus effectively exempting them also from the expected
reciprocity in reductions of trade barriers in MTNs. Now, we believe that letting developing
countries hold on to their trade restrictions is to let them shoot themselves in the foot, that the
same economics applies to them as to others. Their growing importance in  world trade also
makes it politically impossible to maintain huge asymmetries of market access. The imposition of
the same rules on both sets of nations has therefore become the norm, implying a Single
Undertaking. [In this context, the notion that the “least developed countries” should still be
accorded S&D status is to ignore these fundamental lessons.]
Next, the WTO now has an effective Dispute Settlement Mechanism. We have moved
away from an ineffective system where a defendant could veto the adoption by the GATT Council
of an adverse finding. This has removed the incentive to exercise “aggressive unilateralism” of the
Section 301 variety in cases where the defendant did act this way, as in the soyabean case where
the EU had  blocked two successive adverse findings at the GATT and then the US had resorted
unilaterally to retaliatory tariffs.1  The strengthened Dispute Settlement Mechanism has also led to
increased resort to its impartial procedures to cool bilateral disputes which, as in the US-Japan
automobile case, were marked by acrimonious friction inherent to bilateral confrontations. The
WTO resolution of the Eastman-Kodak-Fuji dispute has also served to underline the fact that
unilateral determination of  “unfair trade” by national bodies such as the USTR, on the basis of
complaints by interested national parties, and threats based thereon are simply an unacceptable
way of proceeding in such disputes: the total defeat of Eastman Kodak shows how baseless the
US complaints against Japan are likely to have been, exactly as argued by some of us over the
years in the teeth of assertions backed by few or no arguments. All this is to the good.
Environmental Problems
The environmental interface with WTO rules is also a matter of considerable controversy and I
believe that the time has come to take a concerted look at the problems that have emerged.
First, the basic idea that purely-domestic, as against global,  environmental  pollution
should be dealt with by harmonization or upward movement of lower tax burdens abroad, has an
intuitive appeal. But, as I and Professor Srinivasan have argued (in Bhagwati-Hudec, op.cit.,
Chapter 4), there is a perfectly legitimate case for  diversity in pollution  tax rates for identical
pollution across countries in the same industries (what we call CCII tax burden differences).
Besides, the fears of a race to the bottom, which is theoretically possible, are unjustified by the
empirical findings that corporations seem to use the more environmentally friendly technologies
                                         
1 Section 301 actions where the US is seeking to impose new obligations on others, not covered by earlier treaty
commitments, are still a problem, however, for the US administration if it wishes to abide by the spirit of
multilateralism in the teeth of repeated attempts by US lobbying groups, and Congress, to  impose their demands
on foreign nations. The distinction between these two types of 301 actions was noted and explored in contributions
even where the requirements are more lax. So, the argument that free trade requires fair trade in
the sense of harmonization or upgrading of foreign tax burdens with one’s own is ill-taken. Thus,
most of the arguments advanced against free trade on this account, and the demands that the
WTO should have “social dumping” clauses to permit countervailing duties when the foreign
pollution tax burden is lower, are simply mistaken.
Next, this still leaves open questions of the type raised by the Shrimp-Turtle and the
Dolphin-Tuna decisions. In all these cases, the GATT and WTO judgments are quite sound, in my
view. Speaking very broadly, it makes little sense to legitimate  unilateral assertion of
environmental and social preferences and thereby suspend other WTO members’ access to one’s
markets. It is surely more desirable to reach agreement on these matters through negotiations and,
failing that, to suspend such trade while paying, if challenged at the WTO, suitable compensation
for such unilateral suspension. If we do not do that, the road will open for everyone making such
unilateral assertions and disrupting trade in consequence. The issue requires accommodation of
the kind embodied in the entire set of WTO procedures and ideas on how to handle such conflicts.
The more militant environmentalists and NGOs such as The Public Citizen portray the WTO in
demonized and distorted form on this question when, in fact, their own views are unbending,
unaccommodating  and destructive.
Finally, I believe that, on the global environmental issues, we badly need to grandfather in
the trade sanctions against defectors and free riders in the existing Multilateral Environmental
Treaties, taking them (quickly) one by one to ensure that these potentially targeted nations have
no justifiable case against such a procedure. [For instance, a pacifist in a war is a “conscientious
                                                                                                                              
by me and by Professor Robert Hudec in Jagdish Bhagwati and Hugh Patrick (eds), Aggressive Unilateralism,
Michigan University Press, 1991.
objector”, not a “free rider”.] My own impression is that the MEAs have taken good care to carry
most nations on board through suitable accommodations of the countries that may object.]
MAI
It is probably a heresy to say that the MAI, as presently drafted, and at the present time, is
not a good idea and that it should be shelved temporarily. But the adverse reception accorded to
the unveiling of the OCED-produced draft and the temporary withdrawal of it from any agenda
indicate that there are basic problems with MAI. True, with trade and investment closely tied
together today, an agreement on investment at the WTO  seems a good idea.
But such an agreement must be balanced in at least two ways: first, it should not be just
about removing obstacles to investment but also subventions and subsidies to it; and second, it
must be formulated with the active participation of both developing and developed countries.
Neither has been done.
Besides, tricky questions such as the use of state power against specific foreign firms with
a view to extracting concessions from their governments have not been addressed. Thus, during
the US-Japan auto dispute, it was remarkable that the US was threatening to zero in on Japanese
auto firms’ luxury model exports to the US with punitive tariffs of 100% simply to impose import
targets, component-purchase targets et.al.. All this, while asserting in other contexts the need to
leave multinationals free from political interference in matters of production and trade! Again, the
US was jawboning Japanese transplants into buying more US components, virtually intimidating
these firms into a “local purchase” policy, while pushing for the adoption of TRIMs outlawing the
use of “local content” clauses by host countries for multinationals! MAI does not adequately
come to grips with such transgressions by the powerful countries, while seeking to impose
constraints on the weaker  countries. But it should if it is to be credible.
In addition, I feel that the timing of the MAI is precipitous and bad. Developing countries
are pushing their DFI (direct foreign investment) doors open quite dramatically on their own. If
obstacles are created for DFI, you lose out in the race for more DFI that  almost every country is
engaged in. Why then get into devising MAI and selling it at the WTO when  the market forces
are already leading countries to several pro-DFI practices? By formalizing all this into an explicit
MAI, we make this into a political issue, and invite the anti-DFI lobbies, the anti-WTO lobbies
and all the wackos in every country on to center stage. The WTO is in enough trouble from such
lobbies, which played some role in President Clinton’s defeat on fast-track renewal ; it seems a
foolish idea to add to them gratuitously. In fact, every informed scholar of the politics of
international economic policy knows, the level of political difficulty escalates as you go from free
trade in goods to free trade in services, to freedom of DFI, to freedom of all capital flows, to
freedom of labour flows. We seem to have forgotten all this in the flush of the victory (still
incomplete) of free trade forces at Geneva; but we do so at our peril.
Competition Policy
Finally, I believe that we have to get what Sylvia Ostr  has called “system friction” under
some form of managed control at the WTO. This involves getting into what is best called
“competition policy”.  Two sets of problems in particular are important to distinguish.
First, problems of market access in our exports, and redatio  by exporters in our imports, have
come to the forefront and we need to come to agreed parameters on what is acceptable practice
and what is not.
Second, while we trade economists correctly view trade as the best antidote to domestic
monopoly, it is also true that international cartelisation can kill that therapeutic effect. Clearly,
some form of agreed anti-trust policy, which is not just “anti-big” on a k eejerk basis,  has to be
evolved . That is an important, unfinished task.
